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Abstract— Cognitive Radio (CR) Technology has emerged 
as a smart and intelligent technology to address the problem 
of spectrum scarcity and its under-utilization. CR nodes 
sense the environment for vacant channels, exchange control 
information, and agree upon free channels list (FCL) to use 
for data transmission and conclusion. CR technology is 
heavily dependent on the control channel to dialogue on the 
exchanged control information which is usually in the 
Industrial-Scientific-Medical (ISM) band. As the ISM band 
is publically available this makes the CR network more 
prone to security vulnerabilities and flaws. In this paper a 
novel multi-fold security framework for cognitive radio 
wireless ad-hoc networks has been proposed. Multiple 
security levels, such as, encryption of beacon frame and 
privately exchanging the FCL, and the dynamic and 
adaptive behaviour of the framework makes the proposed 
protocol more resilient and secure against the traditional 
security attacks when compared with existing protocols. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The modern communications have become more 
dependent on wireless technology. Wi-Fi, Cellular phones, 
Bluetooth, TV broadcasts and satellite are proliferation of 
wireless services. The increased number of wireless 
applications from home appliances to satellite control has 
created huge demand for more radio spectrum. For every 
wireless application, certain portion of the radio spectrum 
need to be purchased, and the Federal Communication 
Commission (FCC) allocates the spectrum for fee for such 
services [1]. This has led to the problems like scarcity of 
spectrum, shortage of spectrum to use in new wireless 
services, and lack of radio resource and wireless services 
to those who are more appropriate and needy. Most of the 
frequencies in the radio spectrum have been allocated 
although many studies have shown that the allocated 
bands are not efficiently being used [2] . Cognitive radio 
technology [3][4][5] is a solution to the shortage of 
spectrum and the inefficiency of its utilization. Cognitive 
radios are intelligent wireless devices that sense the 
environment, observe the network changes, and then make 
intelligent decisions, based on knowledge learnt from the 
previous interaction with the network, to seize the 
opportunities to transmit. This process of scanning the 
spectrum (S), exchanging control information (E), 
agreeing upon white space (A) and transmitting data (T) 
on the network is repeated continuously in a cycle. 
Figure.1 shows how a cognitive radio learns from its 
environment and tunes its transceivers to adapt the 
network changes. CR network serves as a framework in 
accessing the spectrum allocation dynamically, and 
spectrum opportunity [5] deals with the usage of a free 
channel that is part of radio spectrum and is not currently 
being used by primary users (PUs). The licensed user or 
PU of the frequency band is the wireless application who 
purchases the portion of radio spectrum from FCC for fee, 
and those who utilizes spectrum opportunistically for 
communication without interference to the PU is called 
secondary user (SU). Each cognitive device is equipped 
with sensors and transceivers that sense the spectrum and 
allow SUs to access licensed spectrum bands as long as 
SUs do not impose any interference to PUs. 
Figure 1. SEAT Cycle for Cognitive Radio Networks 
PUs when not transmitting create free channels or 
empty spaces in the spectrum, and these empty spaces, 
also called white spaces, are used by SUs 
opportunistically. The existence of Common Control 
Channel (CCC) is mandatory for all CR nodes for control 
information exchange. Before any cognitive devices start 
sending and receiving data, they first have to coordinate 
and decide about the transmission on the CCC. The pair of 
SUs exchange initial information such as how to send 
requests, which white spaces to be used and how long the 
communication will last. This information could also 
include the exchange of Request-To-Send (RTS) and 
Clear-To-Send (CTS) control frames in order to solve 
hidden terminal problem and avoid collisions in random 
access protocols which are mostly used by cognitive radio 
devices for exchange of control information. Figure 2 
shows the process of formation of white spaces in the 
spectrum. The CCC could be static or dynamic. Under the 
static case, the control channel can be either specially 
licensed to the secondary users by FCC or use an 
unlicensed spectrum band (e.g., 2.4GHz). In the latter case 
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it is commonly called GCCC. In the dynamic case, the 
control channel could be one of the most reliable and 
available white spaces. 
Figure 2. Spectrum usage by PUs and formation of white spaces 
II. REVIEW OF THE PREVIOUS WORK
The cognitive radio technology that consists of nodes, 
architecture and control strategies, has appeared to be an 
efficient solution for heterogeneous networks. However, 
this leads to security issues because same security 
standards could not be applied in all heterogeneous 
networks. The CR technology merges core network with 
access networks in the heterogeneous environment. 
Wireless standards have different security strategies. For 
example in WLAN and personal area network (PAN) the 
only mechanism to incorporate security is identity 
authentication. In GSM [6], WiMAX [7], WCDMA [8] 
and WCDMA2000 [9], the legality of terminals and user 
is controlled by strict authentication process from base 
station and SIM card authentication. The differences 
between technologies used for cognitive radio and for 
existing wireless networks make the security 
incorporation a veiled question. The adaptive nature of 
cognitive radio technology imposes additional 
complications and introduces new challenges. For 
example an attacker may pretend to be a secondary user 
and without authentication can intercept the FCL by a 
false claim of being an SU, or in another case it can mimic 
the behavior of licensed user and can increase the 
probability of false alarm detection. This is a special type 
of denial-of-service (DoS) attack in CR networks and is 
commonly known as primary user emulation (PUE) attack 
[10] [11] [12]. Another type of attacks specific to CR 
networks is the jamming attack [13] that can push the 
nodes in the vicinity to select a specific spectrum band for 
control information exchange where another attacker 
seizes the control information. 
Physical layer techniques have been intensively 
focused in recent studies to detect the anomalous usage of 
spectrum [11][12][14][15]. The detection of an 
unauthorized usage of the spectrum in zone-based 
networks has been investigated in [14]. Authorized users 
do not impose interference to each other because at most 
one authorized user, i.e., either none or one authorized 
user, can exist in each network zone. Received signal 
powers of unknown signals are measured to detect 
unauthorized spectrum usage. Chen et al [11] have 
proposed a mechanism to verify transmitter which 
assumes that the Primary Signal Transmitter (PST) 
location is known in advance and that PUE attacker 
cannot duplicate the energy of the legitimate signal. If the 
suspicious signal is being transmitted outside the range of 
PST, it is considered as a PUE attack. If the transmission 
of the suspicious signal is received in the PST vicinity, 
energy detection is used to authenticate the signal. A 
protocol for mitigating PUE attacks has been proposed in 
[16] in which each SU uses a centralized spectrum 
decision to decrease the probability of false alarm. 
Goergen et al [17] present a method in which a watermark 
is added to the PU signal. CR nodes retrieve the 
watermark to authenticate the transmitted signal. These 
tasks make use of the physical layer information only, and 
either PU signals are modified or prior information about 
the PU is required to detect PUE and jamming attacks. 
Jamming attacks have also been studied in different recent 
studies [18][19][15]. A primary number sequence code 
has been used by the scheme proposed in [15], in which 
jammer could not compute which channel to jam in given 
time. A game theoretic approach is presented in [19] to 
model the jamming and its contravention in cognitive 
radio multichannel networks. One-stage game and multi-
stage game are obtained by Nash equilibrium and 
stochastic control strategy respectively. Xu et al [20] 
discuss the signal measurement for jammer detection and 
argue that smart jamming attack is a new trend in CR 
networks and new artifacts need to be developed to 
efficiently address these issues. 
To summarize, the work published so far mostly 
emphasizes on the physical layer to address the security 
vulnerabilities in cognitive radio networks. It is believed 
that, apart from the security measurements at the physical 
layer, mechanisms must be derived to incorporate security 
at MAC layer in CR networks. This motivates us to design 
a novel security model for cognitive radio wireless ad-hoc 
networks, which provides multiple levels of security at 
MAC layer. The next section discusses the framework of 
the proposed security model for CR networks. 
III. A NOVEL MULTI-FOLD SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
FOR COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
Cognitive radio networks are opportunistic networks, 
and CR nodes are always haunting to seize the opportunity 
to transmit. It is very important that CR nodes efficiently 
and securely exchange data with each other before the PU 
interference is sensed. The opportunistic nature of the CR 
network under the effect of traditional security flaws could 
not let the CR nodes afford the cost of retransmission. 
We have proposed a novel secure adaptive MAC 
protocol for cognitive radio networks. To the best of 
authors’ knowledge, the proposed protocol named DDH-
MAC (dynamic decentralized and hybrid MAC) is the 
first hybrid CR MAC protocol lying between GCCC and 
non-GCCC family of CR protocols. DDH-MAC not only 
overcomes drawbacks of GCCC but also benefits from the 
24x7 free of cost availability of GCCC. The dynamic, 
adaptive and hybrid behavior of the proposed MAC 
protocol makes a partial use of GCCC to advertise the 
information about control channel establishment within 
the white spaces amongst cognitive nodes. It efficiently 
sets one of the white spaces as the primary control channel 
(PCCH) to exchange control information with other 
cognitive nodes and sets another as the backup control 
channel (BCCH) in case there is a PU claim on PCCH. 
DDH-MAC has a novel design of the MAC protocol for 
CRNs which not only benefits from the anytime license-
free availability of GCCC but also enjoys the secure 
communication by privately exchanging the FCL over one 
of the white spaces. The best features of decentralized 
family of MAC protocols have been combined to make 
the proposed hybrid protocol efficient, dynamic, and 
decentralized. A detailed operation of the protocol 
including 2 levels of selection has already been presented 
in our previous work [21].  The protocol takes into 
account different case scenarios in the cognitive radio 
environment and tunes its parameters efficiently and 
intelligently according to the current situation of the 
network, which makes the protocol adaptive, secure and 
energy efficient. We have defined these case scenarios in 
the following section and will represent all the states with 
a 2n binary function where n = 2. All the possible states of 
DDH-MAC are 00, 01, 10 and 11 as specified below: 
Network initialization and launch of beacon frame (BF) 00 
Reading BF and contending for exchange of FCL  01 
Concluding transmission on agreed WS and scanning PCCH 10 
Concluding transmission on agreed WS and scanning BCCH 11 
Upon initialization, cognitive nodes implementing the 
proposed MAC scan the GCCC for BF. If the node does 
not find any BF then one node is responsible for launching 
BF in the GCCC which let other CR nodes in the vicinity 
know about one of the white spaces to be used as the 
primary control channel and about another as backup 
control channel.  
Figure 3. The DDH-MAC Algorithm 
It is important to note that BCCH is a reserved control 
channel and is used only when there is a PU re-claim on 
PCCH. If the node finds the BF, it reads the information 
about PCCH and BCCH, updates its FCL and switches to 
PCCH for the subsequent control information exchange, 
otherwise it considers itself as the starting node and 
launches the BF in GCCC. During the initial scanning, if 
the BF is successfully found by a CR node in GCCC, it 
learns about the chosen PCCH and BCCH. The 
communicating CR nodes always verify the re-claim of 
PCCH by PU before they actually switch to it for further 
exchange of FCL. After the successful exchange of FCL 
on the chosen PCCH, the CR nodes eventually switch to 
agreed empty spaces to be used as data channels for the 
actual data transmission. The CR nodes may come up with 
a case when there is a re-claim by PUs on both PCCH and 
BCCH; and in this case the nodes go to the initial state 
(00) where they scan the GCCC for any new BF. The 
algorithm for proposed scheme is provided in Figure 3. 
The protocol is dynamic because every time there is a PU 
claim, nodes switch to a newly found and agreed-upon 
control channel. Moreover, the CR nodes are always 
certain that they have access to at least one control 
channel. 
As shown in Figure 4 the proposed protocol provides 
multiple levels of security. Each level provides an unique 
feature of security which altogether makes the proposed 
protocol secure and energy efficient. 
Level 1: Encryption of BF 
The first node in the CR network makes partial use of 
GCCC by launching an encrypted beacon frame. The 
recipients of the BF apply the relevant decryption scheme 
[22][23] to read the information about the PCCH and 
BCCH. 
Level 2: Secure FCL Transaction 
Most of the CR protocols [24][25][26][27][28]  exchange 
the FCL through the GCCC which is publically available 
to everyone and is more prone to security vulnerabilities 
and threats. DDH-MAC uses one of the white spaces as 
PCCH and exchanges the FCL secretly on the chosen 
control channel which is only known to the CR nodes in 
the vicinity. Furthermore, prior to the FCL transaction, all 
frames are encrypted using the public key cryptography 
and only those nodes which have the knowledge of the 
private key can retrieve the information in cryptographic 
frames. 
Level 3: Inclusion of Time Stamp in Data Transmission  
Man-in-the-middle attack is not unusual in the cognitive 
radio environment and any type of the information could 
be retrieved by the intruders. DDH-MAC smartly and 
efficiently addresses the criticality of the situation by 
adding a time stamp in each data transmission. Data is 
expected to reach the destination in a specified time which 
confirms the secure transmission. If the data does not 
reach the intended recipient in specified time with a 
reasonable amount of delay (considering the propagation 
delay), this means that the integrity of the data could have 
been compromised and therefore data is no longer 
trustworthy. 
Initialization Phase:
01.  Search the GCCC for a BF  
02. if BF found 
03.  Read the BF 
04.  Switch to the PCCH 
05.  Sense the PCCH for control information 
06. else Select channels to serve as PCCH & BCCH 
07.  Launch BF 
08.  Go to Step 03 
Negotiating Phase: 
09. After Step 03, sense control information 
10. Contend for the newly found control channel 
(PCCH/BCCH) 
11. Exchange free channel list (FCL) 
12. Agree on a white space  
13 Conclude transmission 
14. Go to Step 05 
Actions after the PU Interference: 
15.  Upon finding information about PCCH and BCCH 
16. Go to Step 04 
17. if Any PU activity sensed on PCCH 
18.  Switch to the BCCH 
19.  Repeat Steps 10-13  
20. if Any PU activity sensed on the BCCH 
21.  Go to Step 01 
22 else Go to Step 10  
23. else Go to Step 10 
Figure 5. Timing Diagram for the proposed protocol, in comparison with CREAM-MAC, A-MAC and OC-MAC 
Level 4: Dynamicity of the Control Channel  
Since DDH-MAC uses one of the white spaces as the 
PCCH and another as the BCCH, the PU claim on these 
local control channels could happen at any time. If the 
PCCH has been reclaimed by the PU, CR nodes 
implementing DDH-MAC will switch to the BCCH to 
continue exchanging control information. If, in the worst 
case, BCCH has also been reclaimed by the PU then nodes 
will switch to the GCCC to search for any BF. The PU 
claim on PCCH and BCCH is beneficial to DDH-MAC 
and actually provides another level of security to CR 
nodes. An attacker targeting PCCH/BCCH through smart 
jamming and PUE attacks will have to re-compile the 
attack strategy from time to time. The dynamicity of 
control channels (PCCH/BCCH) offers CR nodes a high 
level of security. 
Figure 4. The DDH-MAC multi-fold security framework for CR 
networks 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
To analyze the performance of DDH-MAC protocol, 
pre-transmission time has been computed. Pre-
transmission time is defined as ‘the time required in 
exchanging control information on CCC before the actual 
data transmission starts’. Pre-transmission is calculated 
by the number and the size of control frames exchanged 
over the control channel and is heavily affected by the 
responses to PU claims. For example quite a few 
previously proposed CR MAC protocols [26][27][28] 
have no mechanisms to resume data transmission 
whenever there is a PU interference, and these protocols 
have to re-negotiate the entire configuration dialogue 
over the control channel. Since DDH-MAC has got a 
backup control channel and the PU interference is smartly 
addressed by performing a switch operation which not 
only provides time and energy efficiency but also enables 
CR nodes holding delay sensitive data to have to wait less 
time before they actually to send data. Figure 5 shows the 
case scenario in DDH-MAC where CR nodes exchange 
control information over the control channel and PU 
interference is sensed. 
The Pre-Transmission Time 
In this section pre-transmission time has been 
computed for different CR MAC protocols including 
DDH-MAC. After successful exchange of FCL on the 
chosen PCCH, the CR nodes eventually switch to an 
agreed empty space to be used as data channel for the 
actual data transmission. The protocol performs a few 
operations before the network is fully converged. These 
operations include scanning GCCC, launching BF, 
deciding which white spaces to use as PCCH and BCCH, 
and how long to take to exchange control information. 
Not all the operations are performed by CR nodes, and 
the number of operations performed depends on the role 
of the CR node and on the case scenario. For example if a 
node has already found BF, it will not perform the beacon 
launching operation and thus the time TBS will be 
omitted. TBS is defined as the time required to search the 
BF in GCCC, TBF is the time required to launch BF in 
GCCC, TPCCH and TBCCH denote the estimated contention 
time to access PCCH and BCCH, and TDMCF and TFCL are 
time required to exchange the DDH-MAC control 
information. The time it takes to do any or all of these 
operations form part of the pre-transmission time and can 
be expressed in (1). 
TPT  = { TBS, TBF, TPCCH, TBCCH, TDMCF, TFCL}             (1) 
where DMCF, FCL and ACK are control frames being 
exchanged in DDH-MAC with the sizes of 20 bytes, 20 
bytes and 14 bytes respectively. This control information 
is exchanged in GCCC which is publically available to 
every application. The free availability of GCCC makes it 
heavily insecure, and it is believed that the less time spent 
in GCCC, the less would be CR nodes exposed and less 
prone to security vulnerabilities. Thus the higher secuirty 
could be achieved. 
The pre-transmission time for the scenario, when the 
PU interference is detected, is computed using IEEE 
802.11b as benchmark. The normal response by CR nodes 
is to abort the transmission and re-exchange the control 
information to agree upon another white space to conclude 
transmission while the proposed protocol efficiently deals 
with the situation by switching to the BCCH. Less number 
of frames exchanged with other CR nodes results in faster 
network convergence, and nodes remain in the state where 
at least one control channel remains always available with 
all CR nodes. Figure 6 shows the comparison of our 
protocol with several other CR MAC protocols 
[28][25][27] in terms of pre-transmission time. 
Figure 6. Effect of pre-transmission time on security vulnerability 
CONCLUSION
Cognitive radio networks aim to be a promising 
technology to resolve the problem of spectrum scarcity. 
CR nodes must exchange the control information on CCC 
prior to any data transmission. The selection criteria of 
CCC make the CR technology exposed to security risks. 
In addition to traditional security vulnerabilities, CR 
nodes are more prone to new security challenges. In this 
paper a novel multi-fold security framework for CR 
networks has been presented. Incorporation of security at 
different levels in the proposed protocol makes it more 
resilient against security attacks. Especially the selection 
of control channel in white spaces gives the protocol 
extra security where the FCL is privately and secretly 
exchanged with other CR nodes. The less CR nodes stay 
in CCC, the more secure transactions could take place. 
Analytical results show that CR nodes implementing the 
proposed protocol have to access the GCCC only for BF 
transmission which is just a 20-byte frame. The GCCC 
access time for DDH-MAC is only 14.54ȝs, while the 
GCCC access time for any of other protocols is 4 times 
higher. Currently the proposed protocol is being 
simulated for analysis of the effect of PUE and jamming 
attacks on throughput. In future, the incorporation of 
cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and DSA for BF 
and FCL encryption will be investigated. 
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